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Abstract 
This study aims to address the common considerations concerning publicly subsidized sport 
stadiums. To provide an in-depth illustration into this process, a case study narrative of the 
Minnesota Vikings’ journey to receiving a public subsidization totaling $498 million for the 
construction of the U.S. Bank Stadium is presented. As sport stadiums seemingly incorporate 
more luxurious amenities each year, it is not uncommon to see the price tag for a professional 
stadium to surpass a billion dollars. Given this colossal cost, it has become difficult for private 
investments to finance an entire stadium alone. Therefore, combining the private financing of a 
professional sport stadium with a public subsidization has become a prominent and debatably 
essential practice. However, acquiring public financial assistance is not straightforward, but 
rather a scrutinized and complex process requiring appropriate economic and social justification. 
Prior to calling U.S. Bank Stadium home in 2016, the Vikings played at the Metrodome in 
downtown Minneapolis for over 30 years. Due to the Metrodome lacking many desirable 
features, the Vikings began seeking the construction of a new stadium that would position the 
team and the Twin Cities of Minneapolis/St. Paul atop the NFL world. After undergoing a 15-
year political dissension with the citizens of Minnesota and their legislature, the Vikings were 
finally granted their wish in 2012 with a commitment of $498 million in public subsidies to help 
pay for the $1.1 billion U.S. Bank Stadium. The Vikings and U.S. Bank Stadium case study 
depicts an in-depth examination into the foundations, justification, and business of financing a 
modern professional sport stadium. 
Keywords: public subsidization, funding, sport stadium, NFL, Minnesota Vikings, U.S. 
Bank Stadium 
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Introduction 
From 2007–2016, state and local governments spent an annual average of $153 billion on 
public infrastructure (USA Facts, 2021); these expenses commonly include financing for 
transportation (e.g., roads, air travel, and rail), education, health, and utility infrastructure. 
Generally, the public subsidization of infrastructure is rationalized as extensive construction 
costs make producing an adequate supply privately unprofitable (Winston, 2013). Nevertheless, 
government subsidies have become quite inclusive to a private and profitable sport industry 
whose four major professional sport leagues the National Football League (NFL), National 
Basketball Association (NBA), Major League Baseball (MLB), and National Hockey League 
(NHL) combined for just under $40 billion in revenues during their 2018-2019 seasons (Brown, 
2019; Gough, 2020; Gough, 2021; Jones, 2021,). According to Georgia State University’s 
Stadiatrack, 36 professional stadiums in the United States were either constructed or renovated at 
a total cost of $15 billion from 2007–2016. Public finances were responsible for over 50% of this 
total cost. That equates to an average public tab of over $200 million per project, with many 
public contributions frequently approaching and even surpassing half a billion dollars (Georgia 
State University [GSU], 2020).  
In the last few decades, professional sports have experienced an extensive surge in 
demand for increased fan amenities. As a result, the price for a new stadium is reaching an all-
time high. To give perspective, the most recent stadium constructed utilizing public funds is Las 
Vegas Raiders’ new home, Allegiant Stadium, with a total cost of $1.8 billion (GSU, 2020.) 
While franchises possess alternative and more private means of funding these colossal price tags, 
they typically prefer turning to public funding for assistance. In fact, professional franchises will 
even leverage funds from the public through threats of relocation. Nonetheless, public funds are 
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not simply bestowed to franchises as they almost always are accompanied by profound public 
and bureaucratic scrutiny demanding justification for their expenditures. 
The public subsidization of a stadium is an extensive process involving many 
considerations. Although substantial research exists regarding most considerations of publicly 
funded stadiums, their extensive findings can be difficult to discern. Accordingly, the purpose of 
this study is to address the common considerations concerning publicly subsidized sport stadiums. 
To help illustrate this, a case study narrative following the events leading to the public financing of 
U.S. Bank Stadium in the metropolitan area of Minneapolis/St. Paul is presented. The information 
outlined in the literature review provides abstract knowledge and insight into this process. 
Literature Review 
Overview 
The 1990’s marked the start of a stadium revolution for the sporting industry. Up until 
1989 the four major sporting leagues had spent a cumulative total of $672 million on the 
construction of a sport stadium; however, by 2009, this cumulative total had ballooned to over 
$30 billion (Reider, 2009). The cause of these rising costs can be attributed to the incorporation 
of lavish amenities such as luxury suites, restaurants, massive video boards, and intricate 
architecture into the construction designs of a new stadium (Carbot 2009; Shank & Lyberger, 
2015). While these additional amenities provide further revenue streams, they also skyrocket a 
stadium’s price tag (Carbot, 2009). As a result of this amenity arm’s race, the sporting world 
witnessed its first billion-dollar stadium in 2009 when the Dallas Cowboy’s AT&T Stadium was 
erected in Arlington, TX (Reider, 2009; Shank & Lyberger, 2015). While public funding is 
accountable for a significant portion of a stadium’s financing, it is not the only available source 
of funding. 
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Private Financial Contributions 
A collection of methods exists for sport franchises to establish capital funding for a new 
stadium. The most immediate source of private financing confides in franchise owner or 
corporate contributions. Additionally, the sale of stadium naming rights and personal seat 
licenses offer prevalent sources of financing for a sport stadium’s construction (Baker, 2018). 
In 2020 a sport complex totaling approximately $5 billion was completed with sports’ 
newest treasure, SoFi Stadium, as its centerpiece. This new home of the Los Angeles Rams and 
Chargers was constructed with 100% of its expenses covered by private means (Peter, 2020). 
Billionaire businessman and owner of the Los Angeles Rams, Stan Kroenke, was willing to 
inherit the entirety of the debt created in covering the cost of his new stadium. T-Mobile Arena, 
the home of the NHL team Vegas Golden Knights, is a case exampling a form of corporate 
contributions wherein two private organizations, MGMResorts International and Anschutz 
Entertainment Group, partnered to fund the $375 million arena privately. Although many owners 
and corporations can contribute to a significant portion of a stadium's cost, given their rising 
price tags nowadays, most do not possess the finances to fund one entirely through their own 
contributions (Baker, 2018). 
Another commonly used private mean of financial assistance is selling the right to name a 
stadium. Naming rights are a particularly sought-after sponsorship opportunity due to the 
massive amounts of brand exposure it presents (Baker, 2018). The name associated with a sport 
stadium has become nearly as iconic as the stadium itself as its name serves as a symbol vested 
to the city and franchise. As result of this, acquiring a stadium’s naming rights comes a lucrative 
cost (Carbot, 2009). Frequently, the naming rights of a stadium produce between $8–$12 million 
annually for the duration of a decade or more. Stadiums in larger markets, such as New York or 
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Los Angeles, may haul in over $20 million annually (Bien, 2013; Hudson & Saporta, n.d. as 
cited in Baker, 2018). The money generated from a stadium’s naming rights provides a franchise 
with a substantial and steady revenue source to help cover a stadium’s expense. 
A Personal Seat License (PSL) offers further financial support in covering the 
intensifying expense of building a new stadium. PSL’s are an agreement in that when purchased, 
it entitles the licensee the right to buy season tickets for a specific seat in the venue. The sale of a 
PSL is an excellent source of immediate capital (Baade & Matheson, 2011). As a PSL is often 
used to help finance a stadium, they also are referred to as a Stadium Builder’s License, or SBL 
(Baumann & Matheson, 2017). To give an idea of the amount of revenue a PSL can generate, the 
Las Vegas Raiders’ Allegiant Stadium generated an estimated $549 million (Smith, 2020).  
For the four major sporting leagues in the last decade (2010–2020), private funding 
methods have helped cover around 57% of all stadiums’ total costs of construction and 
renovation (GSU, 2020). Given the considerable amount remaining, a franchise generally looks 
in the direction of public aid to help bridge the financial gap. Frequently, this aid translates to 
state or local governments issuing and repaying the debt service of tax-free bonds. 
The Role of Tax-Free Bonds 
The premise behind issuing tax-free bonds is the tax-free returns they offer, which is a 
major incentive for investors (Gayer, Drukker, & Gold, 2016). Under the public purpose 
doctrine, tax-free bonds may finance capital projects and cover operational costs for qualifying 
private industries so long as they provide a significant public benefit. The public purpose 
doctrine applies to a sport stadium’s financing under the determination that in addition to hosting 
a professional sports franchise, they benefit the public by offering space for concerts, festivals, 
and other public events (Meyer v. City of Cleveland as cited in Carbot, 2009). Corrective 
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measures were attempted by the Federal Government to exclude sport stadiums as tax-free 
eligible; however, they ended up further incentivizing their use. So long as state and local 
governments are willing to repay 90% of a bond’s debt service, they may remain tax-free (Gayer 
et al., 2016).  
A 1998 study offers a unique insight into the role of tax-free bonds as it compares a 
stadium’s financing to a marketplace, wherein each stakeholder plays a vital role. In this 
marketplace, state or local governments are the seller, the sport franchise is the buyer, the goods 
are tax incentives, and taxpayers are the supplier. Given the rising costs of stadium construction 
and renovation, sport franchises do not wish to incur the entire financial burden; thus, given the 
opportunity, they seek to maximize any possible assistance (Kalich, 1998). Cities and states 
desire to have a sport franchise located in their region due to the perceived benefits of creating 
jobs and spillover economic cash flows. Additionally, sport leagues govern the supply of 
franchises available. Provided this desire and governed supply, the demand for a franchise rises. 
In some cases, to further propel their demand, franchises will even threaten to relocate if not 
awarded public funding. In response to this heightened demand, cities and states become more 
willing to issue tax-free bonds and repay the debt service (Kalich, 1998; Siegfred & Zimbalist, 
2000). 
A general sales tax may be considered the most universally used source of revenue to 
repay a bonds’ debt. However, cities and states may choose to divert the burden away from their 
local residents by levying taxes onto a niche market. Tax revenues generated by the lodging, 
tourism, and sin (e.g., tobacco, alcohol, or lottery) industries are the commonly targeted niche 
markets since only a fraction of the local population and outside visitors utilize these services 
(Carbot, 2009).  
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Sport Stadium Referendums & Political Persuasion 
When encountered with a scenario involving the requests of public funds a referendum, 
or vote, is often held. As it pertains to sport stadiums the purpose of a referendum is to determine 
the public’s approval for a proposed subsidization (Mondello & Kellison, 2016). Persuasions 
made by both stadium advocates and adversaries strongly influence the public’s perception and 
commitment levels. However, pro-subsidy advocates seemingly possess a more significant 
influence than their adversaries (Hutchinson, Berg, & Kellison, 2018). 
Hutchinson, Berg, & Kellison (2018) examined the role of powerful advocates in the 
process of publicly subsidizing stadiums and identified a prominent theme. When faced with 
insufficient public approval, rather than searching for alternatives, pro-subsidy advocates will 
commit substantial resources to gain necessary public approval or discover workarounds to 
bypass a referendum (Hutchinson et al., 2018). Before the city of Cincinnati contributed public 
funds to the construction of Paul Brown Stadium, the city faced public opposition. In the time 
leading up to the stadium’s official referendum, a $1 million campaign was launched to increase 
stadium support. The referendum ultimately passed (Brown, 2003). For a similar scenario in 
Pittsburgh, a campaign was launched to help garner public support, yet the referendum still 
failed. However, the failing referendum did not halt the public subsidization of a new stadium in 
Pittsburgh. Loopholes and workarounds were discovered to bypass a referendum, thus allowing 
for public funds to be used (Hutchinson et al., 2018). 
A Sport Stadium’s Justification 
A commonly presented justification for the use of public funds towards a sport stadium is 
claiming them as an economic hub. As an economic hub, a stadium promotes increased tourism 
and consumer spending both within the stadium and for surrounding businesses. Furthermore, a 
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new stadium creates thousands of jobs in relation to their construction and operation. These new 
jobs raise income levels and effectively provide local governments’ further tax support and 
contribute to the creation of an economic multiplier of two or more. To put this into perspective, 
if $10 is spent at the stadium, this $10 will help pay a worker’s wage and subsequently be re-
spent at a local store within proximity to the stadium. However, many economists view these 
statements of a sports stadium’s economic impact as flawed due to the concept of opportunity 
cost (Humphrey, 2006).  
Opportunity cost refers to the notion of what consumers must give up when deciding 
where their money is spent. One can easily measure how much money is spent at a sport 
stadium, but it can be challenging to determine where a consumer would alternatively spend their 
money if not at a sport stadium. The concept of opportunity cost can also be applied to a 
government’s subsidization of sport stadium and its creation of jobs. If a government makes the 
decision to spend $500 million on a new stadium, they are consequently giving up their 
opportunity to spend $500 million on other public infrastructure (Wolla, 2017). Furthermore, 
unemployment tends to be quite low for construction workers in metropolitan cities, so had a 
stadium not been built, these workers would likely find employment on a different project 
(Humphrey, 2006). In fact, the authors of the book, Sports, Jobs, and Taxes (1997) suggested 
that a sport stadium has an economic impact equivalent to a midsized department store and stated 
if all of Chicago’s sport franchises were to vanish, the economic impact would be less than 1% 
(Noll & Zimbalist, 1997).  
The work of Seifred & Clopton (2013) suggests a sport stadium can serve as a social 
anchor that supports the development and maintenance of a city’s social capital and collective 
identity. A city’s social capital refers to the quality of relationships among citizens. Sports are 
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uncanny at achieving social interactions between strangers, which is otherwise known as 
bridging. Social bridging establishes a strong collective identity for a city or region (Seifred & 
Clopton, 2013). A prime example of the creation of social identity exists in the city of 
Indianapolis, Indiana. Struggling to expand, Indianapolis leaders aimed to revolutionize the city 
as an attractive commercial and residential destination. In 1974, Indianapolis earned approval to 
begin using millions of public dollars to construct sporting infrastructure. Soon Indianapolis 
became home to USA Swimming and Diving, the National College Athletic Association 
(NCAA) headquarters, the NFL Combine, and other professional, collegiate, and international 
sporting events. Their public investment paid off to the tune of thousands of new jobs, increased 
tourism, commercial development, and a flourishing reputation as one of sports’ finest cities 
(Rosentraub, 2008; Rosentraub, Swindell, & Tsvetkova, 2008 as cited in Seifred & Clopton, 
2013).  
Methodologies 
Case Study Selection 
Opening in 2016, U.S. Bank Stadium is one of the most recently constructed stadiums in all 
professional sports. The recent completion of U.S. Bank Stadium will provide a modern relevancy. 
This new home of the Minnesota Vikings bore a total cost of nearly $1.1 billion, with $498 million 
provided by public subsidizations (Grumney, Thomas, & Boswell, 2016; Minnesota House Fiscal 
Analysis Department [MHFAD], 2012). U.S. Bank Stadium is located in Minneapolis, MN, but its 
implications carry beyond the city’s limits. Minneapolis closely relates to the neighboring city of 
St. Paul, MN, and several surrounding counties. Therefore, this region will otherwise be referred to 
as the Twin Cities Metro. The Twin Cities Metro bears an extensive history that date backs to the 
early 1960’s concerning professional sport franchises and publicly subsidizing stadiums. 
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According to the U.S. Census, it estimates the Twin Cities Metro had a total population of 3.1 
million in 2018 (Metropolitan Council, 2019).  
Data Source and Search Strategy 
 
A collection of data retrieved online including web sources, news editorials, published 
reports, and legislative documents was utilized to develop an impartial and holistic narrative of 
U.S. Bank Stadium. To develop the common era of professional sports in the Twin Cities Metro, 
the data used to develop the study ranged from the early 1950’s to 2021.  Each resource 
contributed unique perspectives and information to the completion of the case and supplied a 
cross-examination of the facts presented. 
Many claims and interpretations are made throughout this case study; therefore, it is 
important to address their reliability and validity, or the extent to which a source may be trusted. 
Most editorials possess an agenda tailored to satisfy a purpose they must fulfill, which may be 
cause for bias. Additionally, sources involving reports or numerical records may also contain 
biases. The recognition and acknowledgment of these biases will contribute to the study’s 
credibility, impartiality, and holistic nature (Russel, 2007). To help rid this case study of any 
biases and to help ensure the reliability of the information presented, significant claims were 
cross-referenced with at least one, but in most cases multiple, sources. Furthermore, any bias 
thought to be present was omitted. 
Case Study of U.S. Bank Stadium 
From Metropolitan Stadium to the Metrodome  
During the 1950’s, leaders of the Twin Cities Metro felt their region was suited to gain a 
professional sporting franchise (Cullum, 1953). With this aspiration at the forefront, the 
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLICLY SUBSIDIZED SPORT STADIUMS 13 
 
Metropolitan Sports Area Commission, MSAC, was created in 1954. In 1956, construction was 
completed on a privately financed $4.5 million stadium in Bloomington, MN known as 
Metropolitan Stadium (Minnesota Legislative Reference Library [MLRL], 2020). In 1960, the 
Twin Cities received a relocated MLB franchise from Washington D.C. and an expansion 
franchise from the NFL (Cullum, 1960; Johnson, 1960). These newly founded teams would be 
known as the Minnesota Twins and Vikings, respectively. The Twins and Vikings played their 
inaugural seasons in 1961, sharing Metropolitan Stadium as their home field (MLRL, 2020). 
Already by the 1970’s, the Twins and Vikings began voicing concerns over Metropolitan 
Stadium’s inadequate seating capacity, age, and exposure to the weather (Early, 1975; MLRL, 
2020). Talks for a new domed stadium commenced, but nothing came to fruition until 1977 
when the Minnesota Sports Facilities Commission, MSFC, was created. The current MSAC 
disbanded, and their employees transferred to the MSFC (MLRL, 2020). Then in 1982, the 
100% publicly funded Hubert H. Humphrey Metrodome was constructed at the cost of $55 
million (Cameron, 2019; Weiner, 2001). The Twins and Vikings, along with the football team 
for the University of Minnesota, played their first games in the Metrodome that same year 
(Cameron, 2019; MLRL, 2020). After standing for nearly 30 years, Metropolitan Stadium was 
demolished in 1985 (MLRL, 2020).  
Fast forward to 1997, and the Metrodome was beginning to become prematurely outdated 
at a mere 15-year life. By this time, the Minnesota Twins had already begun to voice their 
concerns by stating the Metrodome was economically obsolete and an insufficient venue for 
baseball (Berg, 1995; Weiner, 1997). In favor of the Twins’ efforts, leaders of the Vikings began 
voicing similar concerns over the Metrodome’s lack of amenities (Weiner, 1997). Given a clause 
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in their lease the Twins could escape the Metrodome due to economic loss, but the Vikings were 
under strict lease with the MSFC through the 2011 NFL season (Noll & Zimbalist, 1997). 
The Stadium Saga Begins  
In 1998, Red McCombs, a businessman from San Antonio, purchased the Vikings for 
$206 million (Millea, 1998; MLRL, 2020). As one of his first actions as owner, McCombs stated 
the Vikings need a new stadium (MLRL, 2020). In the 1990’s alone, 19 NFL franchises had 
already received public funding to refurbish their current stadium or construct a new one 
altogether. These NFL stadiums included luxurious amenities such as restaurants, suites, and 
club seats (Weiner, 1999). The Vikings currently ranked near the bottom in NFL stadium 
revenue. Without a new stadium, the Vikings revenue would continue to decline, making it 
difficult to remain economically competitive with other NFL teams (Munsey & Suppes, 2013; 
Weiner, 1999).  
In the wake of this demand, the MSFC released plans to refurbish the Metrodome. The 
plan was to build the Twins a new stadium, while the Vikings received a renovated Metrodome. 
A proposal for a $160 million Metrodome renovation that would add luxury boxes and club 
seating emerged. With no interest in a refurbished Metrodome, the Vikings rejected and 
counteracted this proposal by stating they wished to build a $400 million stadium financed with a 
$300 million public subsidy (MLRL, 2020; Munsey & Suppes, 2013). To the Vikings dismay, 
Minnesota citizens and legislators were unwilling to provide public funding. In fact, a poll by the 
Star Tribune overwhelmingly found that two-thirds of respondents strongly opposed the idea of 
using public funds to help the Twins or Vikings build a stadium. McCombs and the Vikings were 
becoming fearful of the financial repercussions they may face if not given a new stadium in the 
next five years (Munsey & Suppes, 2013). Soon after, the University of Minnesota joined the 
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Vikings and Twins in stating they too required a new stadium. The University’s lease at the 
Metrodome was currently set to end in 2011 (Olson, 2001).  
To appease the needs of the Vikings, Twins, and University of Minnesota, Minnesota 
Governor Jesse Ventura organized a task force to listen to their needs and develop a report for 
the 2002 legislative session (MLRL, 2020). In just over a year, Ventura’s task force heard 
testimonies by members of the Vikings, Twins, the University of Minnesota, and pro-subsidy 
Minnesota residents and legislators. These testimonies regarded the three sports teams as public 
assets which provide jobs, social interaction, tourism, and community pride (Stadium Task 
Force, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c). While nothing in terms of a new stadium ever resulted from this 
task force, the MSFC was able to slightly improve the Vikings’ financial situation by waiving 
their annual rent (Metropolitan Sports Facility Commission [MSFC], 2002).   
In 2003, the state of Minnesota received a new Governor, Tim Pawlenty. In his initial 
attempt to address the stadium issues, Governor Pawlenty organized a 20-person stadium 
screening committee to advise and compose a proposal of possible stadium finance structures 
involving public support for the 2004 legislature (MLRL, 2020). The committee’s official 
proposal recommended the Twins and Vikings both receive a new stadium with public 
assistance, while the University of Minnesota explore possible private funding options. The 
committee’s proposal formally acknowledged the Vikings’ stadium desires (Stadium Screening 
Committee, 2004; Weiner, 2004).  
Despite the minor progress made over the past few years, the Vikings’ owner Red 
McCombs became impatient. In 2005, McCombs sold the team to New Jersey’s Zygmunt “Zygi” 
Wilf for $600 million. As their new owner, Wilf promised to keep the Vikings in Minnesota and 
continue pursuing a new stadium (Bailey, 2005; Williams, 2005). At this time, the most 
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLICLY SUBSIDIZED SPORT STADIUMS 16 
 
favorable proposal at the table for a new publicly subsidized Vikings’ stadium was a $600 
million indoor venue located in Blaine, MN (MLRL, 2020).   
Victory for the Twins and the University of Minnesota  
Fast forward to 2006 and the Twins and University of Minnesota both struck deals to 
build publicly subsidized stadiums. The University’s TCF Bank Stadium was set to open in 
2009, and the Twins’ new ballpark, Target Field, in 2010 (Kaszuba, 2006). Target Field, located 
in downtown Minneapolis boar a total cost of approximately $545 million, with $392 million 
covered by a 0.15% Hennepin County sales tax increase and the rest in contributions from the 
Twins’ organization (Munsey & Suppes, 2014 & Schill, Templin, & Berg, 2006). On the other 
hand, TCF Bank Stadium, located on the St. Paul campus and at with final cost of $288.5 
million, is funded through a 25-year annual payment of $10.25 million from Minnesota’s general 
fund along with donations, naming right revenues, and student fees (Kaszuba, 2006; Schill et al., 
2006; University of Minnesota Athletics, 2021). 
Following the Twins’ and the University of Minnesota’s journeys closing with two new 
stadiums, the political focus shifted towards the Vikings’ current stadium proposal in Blaine, 
MN, whose costs were now exceeding $1 billion. Given these rising costs, the MSFC embarked 
on an investigation of the 20-acre downtown Minneapolis site, on which the Metrodome 
currently sat, to be another possible stadium location. Their investigation concluded this 
downtown site to be the most logical and cost-effective location for a new Vikings stadium as it 
sits between two major freeways, has access to the light rail, and is near other vital amenities 
such as hotels and restaurants. On the heels of this investigation, discussions over the Blaine 
stadium location ceased (MLRL, 2020; Moyer, 2006). Despite now having a favorable 
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location, the Vikings entered a political stalemate from 2007–2008 in which no significant 
progress was made (MLRL, 2020).   
The Vikings’ Final Lap  
By 2009, the Vikings had been pursuing a new stadium with little progress for more than 
a decade. No longer were they simply near the bottom in NFL stadium revenues, but now dead 
last at a reported annual revenue of $30 million less than any other team in the NFC North 
Division (Munsey & Suppes, 2013). Amid the continuous failing stadium discussions, rumors 
had begun to surface regarding a possible Vikings relocation to Los Angeles. Although, at this 
time, the Vikings owner Zygi Wilf stated he did not intend to relocate the team (Blount, 2009).  
With the Vikings lease end fast approaching, the MSFC and Minnesota State Legislature 
were beginning to fret the future of the Vikings in Minnesota. In an attempt to buy time, the 
Vikings were presented a 2-year lease extension which would keep them at the Metrodome 
through the 2013 season. If not signed, it was threatened that the Vikings may have to resume 
paying their annual rent, which had been waived back in 2002 (Krawczynski, 2009; MSFC, 
2002). In exasperation, the Vikings declined the offer and said they had zero intentions of 
renewing a lease at the Metrodome (Campbell, 2009; MLRL, 2020; Munsey & Suppes, 2013). In 
a 2010 statement released by the franchise, the Vikings expressed that resolving their stadium 
issues is crucial to the long-term success of the franchise in Minnesota and declared a stadium 
solution must be finalized (Minnesota Vikings, 2010).   
Disastrously, in December of 2010, the Metrodome’s roof collapsed due to heavy 
snowfall. As a result of this collapse, the Vikings were forced to play the remainder of their 
season at the University of Minnesota’s newly constructed TCF Bank Stadium. Before the 2011–
2012 season, the Metrodome received a new roof with costs covered through insurance. The 
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roof’s collapse sparked new life into the Vikings’ pursuit to rid themselves of the Metrodome 
(Munsey & Suppes, 2013; Peters & Young, 2020). Throughout 2011, debates over possible 
funding sources and proposals for a stadium on the favored Downtown East site, along with a 
handful of other sites, commenced. In January of 2012, a total of ten proposals were submitted to 
the Minnesota State Legislature, with the Downtown East site being one (MLRL, 2020).  
Finally, after a 15-year battle, in May of 2012, the Minnesota Legislature formally passed 
a bill, referred to as Chapter 299, granting public financing to the Vikings for a new football 
stadium located on the Downtown East site. The passing of Chapter 299 also authorized the 
formation of a new Minnesota Sports Facilities Authority, MSFA, to own and oversee the new 
stadium. The new Authority subsequently abolished the 50-year-old MSFC and assumed all of 
their assets (MHFAD, 2012; MLRL, 2020). Given the public ownership, the MSFA would be 
exempt from paying any building, material, or property taxes (MHFAD, 2012). 
The Vikings finished their 2012 and 2013 seasons at the Metrodome, playing their final 
game on December 29, 2013 (Nelson, 2013). The Metrodome was later demolished in early 2014 
to make way for their new stadium. Over the 2014 and 2015 seasons, the Vikings played at TCF 
Bank Stadium on the University of Minnesota’s campus. In compensation, TCF Bank Stadium 
received $6.6 million in capital improvements and the University was paid approximately $3 
million for each season played on their campus (MLRL, 2020; Ross, 2013). In just over two 
years of construction, the officially named $1.1 billion U.S. Bank Stadium, otherwise dubbed as 
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Vikings’ Stadium Cost Breakdown 
The initial cost projection for the Vikings’ new stadium was $975 million; however, due 
to future improvements, this total grew to a rounded $1.1 billion. In total, $498 million of the 
stadium would be publicly subsidized through a combination of city and state finances. The 
remaining over half-billion dollars would be provided by the Vikings via private means 
(MHFAD, 2012 & Grumney et al., 2016). Additionally, the Vikings must pay an annual rent of 
$8.5 million to the MSFA (Platt, 2016) (Table 1).  
Table 1: Breakdown of U.S. Bank Stadium Funding (TVM 2012–2016) 
Public Costs 
State of Minnesota $348 million 
City of Minneapolis $150 million 
Total Public Cost: $498 million 
Private Costs 
NFL loan $200 million 
SBL revenues $125 million 
Stadium naming rights deal $220 million 
Stadium cost over-runs ≈ $20 million 
Total Private Cost: $545 million 
Total Cost: ≈  $1.1 billion 
1997 1998 2004 2005 2008 2009 2010 Jan. 2012
May 
2012 2016
Vikings state need 
for a new stadium 
Pawlenty’s 
Committee finds 
need for stadium 
 
Red McCombs 
buys Vikings Red McCombs 












for new Vikings’ 
stadium submitted 
$498 million public 
subsidy approved 
for new stadium 
U.S. Bank 
Stadium opens 
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Of the pledged $498 million in public subsidies, the city of Minneapolis is responsible for 
$150 million and the state of Minnesota for $348 million (MHFAD, 2012). In 2014, to generate 
money for their capital expenditure, the State issued appropriation bonds totaling $462 million, 
with $392 million being tax-exempt (State of Minnesota [SOM], 2014). The remaining $36 
million (of the $498 million total) in public financing was paid in a one-time upfront transaction. 
The bonds were issued to the public in denominations of $1,000, with maturity dates ranging 
from 2015 to 2043, and at an average interest rate of 4.27%. The 30-year debt service associated 
with these bonds is paid through annual appropriations from the State’s general fund for both the 
state of Minnesota and city of Minneapolis’ contributions (Nelson, 2014; SOM, 2014).  
According to a document written by the MFHAD (2012), the State’s $348 million 
contribution is backed with revenues generated from an expansion of charitable gambling 
including bingo, paddle wheels, and electronic/paper pull-tabs in bars and restaurants. In addition 
to paying back the State’s contribution to U.S. Bank Stadium, 0.5% of all expanded gambling 
revenues are appropriated to the National Council on Problem Gambling and an annual $2.7 
million given to the city of St. Paul to assist in the operating/capital expenses of new or existing 
sports facilities. 
The city of Minneapolis’s source of funding to pay for their $150 million contribution 
comes from an array of existing local sales, liquor, lodging, and restaurant taxes initially levied 
in 1986 to cover their Convention Center’s debt service. These taxes were originally set to end in 
2020, but the passing of Chapter 299 extended them through 2046 and in 2021 will divert their 
revenues to cover the City’s contribution to U.S. Bank Stadium. As these tax revenues must first 
repay bonds for the Minneapolis Convention Center through 2020, the state of Minnesota agreed 
to cover Minneapolis’ stadium expense from 2014–2020 and later recapture their money spent 
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on behalf of the City starting in 2021 through the year 2046. Additionally, Chapter 299 
authorized a stadium operations/capital payments reserve that is funded by these Minneapolis tax 
revenues. Annual allocations of $7.5 million were placed in this reserve fund starting in 2014. 
(MFHAD, 2012).  
The Vikings funded the remaining over half-billion dollars of the $1.1 billion U.S. Bank 
Stadium through a variety of private means. Most of the immediate funds for construction were 
raised through a $200 million NFL loan and another $250 million private loan, with the rest 
coming from an undisclosed source (Carlson & Ostrow, 2014). 
The NFL’s $200 million loan can be broken into three different sums where $100 million 
plans to be repaid using their share of visiting game ticket revenues, $50 million using general 
team revenues, and the last $50 million not having to be repaid if the team agreed to generate 
further revenues by selling stadium builder’s licenses, or SBL’s (Carlson & Ostrow, 2014; 
Schafer, 2015). 
On the directive of the $50 million incentive from the NFL, the Vikings issued SBL’s for 
75% of their new stadiums’ approximate 70,000 seat capacity. With the average SBL selling for 
about $2,500, the Vikings generated around $125 million for the construction of their stadium 
(BMTN Staff, 2014; Muret, 2014).  In September of 2014, the Vikings reportedly sold the 
stadium’s name to U.S. Bank for a contracted $220 million over 25 years, creating an annual 
revenue source of about $8.8 million (Tomasson, 2015). The remaining $20 million (although 
this amount is relatively undisclosed) in over-run costs for stadium construction were paid for in 
conjunction by the Vikings and MSFA (Baker, 2016).  
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Minnesota’s Public Perception of the U.S. Bank Stadium Deal 
The public subsidization of U.S. Bank Stadium secured the future of the Vikings in 
Minnesota and provided further tax revenue opportunities through the creation of jobs, selling of 
goods, and a promise of future downtown development. Moreover, after replacing the 
Metrodome, Minnesota would now have a state-of-the-art venue to host multiple local events and 
attract mega-events such as the Super Bowl, which would stir immense economic 
activity (Lanning, Rosen, & Rybak, 2014; Johnson, 2012). However, many Minnesotans still had 
a mix of emotions regarding their subsidization of U.S. Bank Stadium.   
First and foremost, a city of Minneapolis charter passed in 1978 forbid any public funds 
exceeding $10 million be used towards financing a professional sports facility unless approved 
through a public referendum, and yet, $150 million was approved without one. Many 
Minnesotans, particularly Minneapolis residents, felt the deal was unfair due to this bypassing of 
a referendum (Scheff, 2014). No matter how unfair it may seem, this Minneapolis charter was 
not violated due to a legal interpretation. Since the Minneapolis hospitality taxes being used to 
subsidize the stadium was passed and levied in 1986, no new taxes were actually imposed. 
Furthermore, because the revenue from these taxes were directly claimed and appropriated by the 
state of Minnesota, the money was never in possession of the City and considered not theirs. Had 
a referendum been required, the fate of the Vikings’ new stadium may have been different. 
According to a Star Tribune poll, a majority of Minnesotans (and Minneapolis citizens) still 
opposed a public subsidization, despite the Vikings’ urgency and rumors of the team’s possible 
relocation to Los Angeles (Greenberg, 2017).   
Additionally, the legislature’s deal with the Vikings involved confusing information 
which could be misunderstood. For instance, Minneapolis’ $150 million contribution to the 
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stadium’s cost is relatively straightforward; however, their $7.5 million per year allocations to 
the stadium’s reserve fund is overlooked. Over the 30 years Minneapolis is expected to pay for 
the stadium, their contribution is actually $375 million for the construction and operation of U.S. 
Bank Stadium. After inflation and interest, this contribution is closer to $631 million. These 
major allocations of public resources harm the future of Minneapolis because there will be fewer 
annual appropriations for essential government services, including education, transportation, and 
government-assisted programs (Carlson & Ostrow, 2014).  
U.S. Bank Stadium’s Economic Impact 
Along with being the site of a new billion-dollar stadium, Downtown East Minneapolis 
offers easy access to the light rail and a variety of other popular entertainment options, and yet, 
this site had been unable to attract investment, and as a result, possessed a multitude of 
undeveloped real estate (Moore, Roper, & Meryhew, 2013; Ryan Companies, 2021). Shortly 
following the announcement of U.S. Bank Stadium, plans emerged to revitalize a 5-block area 
around the stadium in Downtown East Minneapolis with the additions of two 17 story office 
buildings, a renovated Millwright Building, a 200-unit apartment complex, a Radisson Hotel, 
26,000 square feet of retail space, four skyways connected to the stadium, a parking ramp, and a 
public green space known as ‘the Commons.’ This $588 million development project was 
completed in 2016. In total, only $84 million in public financing helped to fund the construction 
of the skyways, parking ramp, and green space. The remaining $504 million was privately 
funded (Ryan Companies, 2021). In addition to this $588 million project, numerous other 
privately financed developments accompanied the construction of U.S. Bank Stadium. In all, 
Downtown East Minneapolis received over $1 billion in investments.  
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Since its announcement in 2012, an abundance of economic activity has been reported in 
connection to U.S. Bank Stadium. With its construction beginning in 2014, more than 300 
Minnesota based firms and 8,000 jobs were involved in completing U.S. Bank Stadium. 
Moreover, around $1 billion in construction costs stayed within the state of Minnesota. Over the 
two years, an average of 1,500 people worked on the stadium per day (Flores, 2021). Succeeding 
its inauguration in 2016, U.S. Bank Stadium has welcomed an average of 1.6 million visitors per 
year to its more than 600 annual events (Minnesota Sports Facility Authority [MSFA], 2019). 
Furthermore, to this day, the stadium has successfully attracted mega-events such as the Super 
Bowl, NCAA Men’s Final Four, and the Summer X-Games twice. These three events alone 
combined for an estimated $700 million economic impact on the Twin Cities Metro (Flores, 
2021).  
Discussion 
Many key points presented themselves throughout the case study, with the three most 
important being: (1) The progression of sport stadiums (2) The government, public, and social 
influences which surround stadium proceedings (3) The financial and economic implications of 
U.S. Bank Stadium. 
Progression of Sport Stadiums 
When the Vikings first came to the Twin Cities in 1961, they played their home games at 
Metropolitan Stadium, a venue with none of the luxurious amenities seen today. Eventually, in 
1982, the team progressed to the Metrodome, which offered a handful of attractive suites, video 
boards, and club seating during its early days. However, as time progressed, the Metrodome 
quickly became outdated compared to the array of flashy new sport stadiums built during the late 
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1990’s and early 2000’s. Then in 2016, the construction of U.S. Bank Stadium delivered modern 
relevancy back to the Vikings and Twin Cities Metro (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: The progression of the Minnesota Vikings’ Sport Stadiums over the Years 
Metropolitan Stadium (1956-1985) 
Metropolitan Stadium, 2020 
Tenants: Minnesota Vikings & Minnesota Twins 
Location: Bloomington, MN ⁸ 
Cost to Construct: $8.5 million (1956) 
Funding Sources: 0% public, 100% private ¹¹ 
Football Capacity: 48,446 ⁵ 
Stadium summary/Fan Amenities: Open-air stadium; cantilevered 
grandstands; bleachers; standing room viewing; one scoreboard; 
concession stands; no concourse; grass field ⁶⁵⁸. 
H.H.H. Metrodome (1982-2014) 
Munsey & Suppes, 2013 
Tenants: Minnesota Vikings, Minnesota Twins, University of Minnesota⁶ 
Location: Minneapolis, MN (Downtown East) 
Cost to Construct: $55 million (1982) 
Funding Sources: 100% public, 0% private ¹¹¹ 
Football Capacity: 64,035 ² 
Stadium Summary/Fan Amenities: 900,000 ft²; Teflon coated fiberglass 
roof; armchair seats; over 110 luxury boxes; 22 ft wide concourse; 2 video 
boards approximately 646 ft² in size; concessions and food/beverage 
vendors ²³⁴⁷. 
U.S. Bank Stadium (2016-Present) 
Ryan Companies, 2021 
Tenants: Minnesota Vikings 
Location: Minneapolis, MN (Downtown East) ¹⁰ 
Cost to Construct: $1.1 Billion (2016) ³¹⁰ 
Funding sources: 48% public, 52% private  
Football Capacity: 66,200 ¹⁰ 
Stadium Summary/Fan Amenities: 1.75 million ft²; transparent roof; 5 
hydraulic doors; over 130 luxury boxes; 9 clubs/bars; an 8,160 ft² video 
board & 4,400 ft² video board; open concourse; merchandise 
stores/kiosks; approximately 38 food/beverage options at 59 locations; 
public Wi-Fi; Legacy Ship with 2,000 ft² video board sail; skyways. ³⁹ 
Cameron, 2016¹; Dome History ²; Grumney et al., 2016³; Kaszuba, 2007⁴; Metropolitan Stadium, n.d⁵; Prescott; 
2001⁶; Rand, 2001⁷; Reichard, 2010⁸; U.S. Bank Stadium, 2021⁹; US Bank Stadium, 2020¹⁰; Weiner, 2001¹¹ 
Government, Public, and Social Influences 
As depicted in the case study, intense public and political scrutiny followed the Vikings from 
their initial attempt to garner public support for a new stadium in 1997 through U.S. Bank 
Stadium’s completion in 2016. Furthermore, it could be debated that the Vikings would never 
have secured public funding for their stadium if it were not for a political workaround. Many 
teams journey towards the subsidization of a sports stadium involves indecision, divided public 
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support, and various government influences. For example, the Cincinnati Bengals and Pittsburgh 
Steelers also faced bleak public support but were able to attain a subsidization due to political 
loopholes and coalition campaigning (Hutchinson et al., 2018).  However, some teams do not 
always succeed in gaining political or public support. Before relocating to Las Vegas in 2020, 
the Raiders sought a new stadium in Oakland, but due to political indecision and unacceptable 
stadium solutions, the team left for a city that did offered public support (Musa, 2020). 
An interesting dynamic to point out in this case study is the Vikings’ relationship and 
competition with the other sport teams located in the Twin Cities Metro. Accompanying the 
Vikings’ efforts were the Minnesota Twins and University of Minnesota. These aligned efforts 
were both favorable and troublesome. Favorably, the aligned interests of the Vikings, Twins, and 
University of Minnesota made for a prominent issue in the eyes of political and public leaders. 
However, on the flip side, it was clear Minnesota citizens were hardly willing to publicly 
subsidize one stadium, let alone three. In a balancing act, the Minnesota Legislature essentially 
prioritized each team in order of their Metrodome lease’s possible ending dates: Twins (1998), 
University of Minnesota (2011), and Vikings (2012) (Olson, 2001; Suppes & Munsey, 2013; & 
Weiner, 1997). As a result, many efforts of the Minnesota Legislature were indecisive and 
arguably involved stalling tactics, thus causing frustration for the impatient Vikings.  
Financial and Economic Implications of U.S. Bank Stadium 
The breakdown of a stadium’s financing generally involves a mixture of public and 
private financial means. This case study of U.S. Bank Stadium presented multiple examples of 
the different funding options available. The private means of funding available to the Vikings 
included the selling of stadium builder’s licenses and stadium naming rights. Furthermore, the 
NFL granted the team a $50 million contribution they do not have to repay as an incentive to sell 
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their SBL’s. These three private sources alone were responsible for financing approximately 
$345 million, leaving the Vikings’ ownership with approximately $150-$200 million to fund. 
The public financing options used in the funding of U.S. Bank Stadium involved the issuance of 
bonds backed by revenues generated from niche market hospitality taxes and charitable 
gambling. The reliance on these niche market revenues helps divert the burden away from 
Minnesota/Twin City Metro residents and on to tourists and the fraction of the public who utilize 
gambling services. 
The economic impact of U.S. Bank Stadium presented in the case study represents a 
variety of positive repercussions for the Twin Cities Metro. The 8,000 jobs and over $1 billion in 
construction costs undoubtedly supplied significant additional income and sales tax revenues for 
the State and Twin Cities Metro. Furthermore, reports state U.S. Bank Stadium hosts nearly 600 
events each year. This is significant because when an event is hosted at U.S. Bank Stadium it 
increases tourism and foot traffic to the area, thus injecting cash flows into surrounding 
businesses.  
Nevertheless, some economists state the impacts of sporting events are overrated and fail 
to account for opportunity cost or displaced tourism. For example, when the Vikings host a home 
game, it could be assumed that traveling fans will consume various amenities of the Twin Cities 
Metro including, hotels, bars, and restaurants. On the other hand, these same amenities may still 
have been utilized by other travelers or tourists in town for different reasons had U.S. Bank 
Stadium not been constructed. 
Despite these accusations by economists, U.S. Bank Stadium has attracted a handful of 
mega-events, with Super Bowl LII recently accounting for the most significant economic impact. 
An estimated 125,000 visitors, 95% from out of state, came to the Twin Cities Metro for the 
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Super Bowl festivities, resulting in a total of a $400 million economic impact and $32 million in 
further tax revenues; even after accounting for an estimated loss of $80 million in displaced 
tourism the Super Bowl may have caused (McGill, & Gray, 2018). 
Even though a sport stadium’s true economic footprint can be difficult to discern, it is 
hard to deny that without U.S. Bank Stadium the Twin Cities Metro most likely would not have 
been able to host Super Bowl LII, the Final Four, the Summer X-Games, or other possible future 
mega-events. Additionally, the presence of U.S. Bank Stadium could be labeled as the prime 
catalyst to the mainly privately financed Downtown East development (Hartman, 2018). 
Conclusion 
As sport stadiums evolve and continually add fan amenities, their costs are now reaching 
all-time highs. Consequently, the public subsidization of a professional sport stadium has 
become a common and debatably essential practice as a franchise is either unwilling or unable to 
fund them exclusively through private means. Given that the public funds involved in financing a 
professional sport stadium require a significant contribution (generally from tax revenues), this 
issue has fallen under immense scrutiny. Throughout this case study’s narrative, the Vikings and 
other stakeholders encountered several obstacles along their journey towards the development of 
U.S. Bank Stadium, thus providing foundational insights into the political action, public 
influences, and financial considerations of publicly subsidizing a professional sport stadium. The 
key takeaways from this reading allow for the formation of an informed opinion and may be 
applied across all professional sports. 
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